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Abstract In Cameroon, around 18 percent of children aged between 10-14 years old
grow up within a sibship extended to host one (or more) foster-child. This proportion is
similar in other African countries and in particular West African ones. This paper aims at
estimating the effect of foster-children supply on biological children education demand of host
parents in Cameroon. To address the endogeneity of foster-children supply, we estimate both
decisions within a recursive bivariate probit framework and use, as our identifying variable,
the father’s birth order among his brothers. Indeed, in patrilineal societies as in Cameroon,
kinship rules involve children to be hosted by brothers of the male kin group, and more likely
by the eldest. Using data from the demographic and health survey of Cameroon (2004), a
dataset uniquely suitable for our purpose since information on the father’s birth order are
available, we find that children hosting school-age foster-relatives have a significant lower
probability to attain their basic level of education relative to those who do not. This suggests
that households hosting school-age foster-relatives due to kinship rules suffer from liquidity
constraints preventing them from educating further their biological children. Through this
result, we highlight the importance of the motive underlying child fostering to determine its
spillover effects.
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1 Introduction
The non-traditional structure of households in developing countries has long been high-
lighted as an important determinant of these households’ welfare by a number of economists.
Its relevance has been shown not only for labor sharing and risk pooling (Udry, 1994 ; Cain,
1981) but also for information flows (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1985) and resource pooling
for children education (Lloyd and Blanc, 1996). Recently, economists have questioned the
welfare effects of the non-traditional structure of African sibships on children themselves
(Serra, 2009; Akresh, 2007; Taiwo, 2007; Evans, 2004; Lloyd and Desai, 1992). In particular,
following the expansion of AIDS pandemic in these countries, the question of the impact of
orphans supply on the welfare of host parents’ biological children has been raised (Taiwo,
2007; Evans, 2004)1. In this paper, we are more particularly interested in the effect of
foster-children supply on the welfare of host parents’ biological children2.
Well-documented by anthropologists and demographers, the practice of child-fostering is
widespread in developing countries and in particular in West African ones (Isiugo-Abanihe,
1985)3. According to the DHS report of 11 West African countries, the proportion of foster-
children among children younger than 14 years old varies between 5.9 percent in Burkina-Faso
to 16.8 percent in Liberia and equals in average to 9.5 percent in the region (table1). With
such a prevalence rate, the probability for a child to grow up in a household hosting a foster-
child is therefore high in these countries. In Cameroon, for instance, 18 percent of children
aged between 10 and 14 years old and raised by both of their biological parents live with one
or more foster-children4.
1While Evans (2004) finds no significant impact of hosting orphans on biological children education on
a sample of African countries, Taiwo (2007) finds a significant positive effect on the youngest biological
children health outcomes in Malawi.
2Foster-children are non-orphaned children sent by their biological parents to another home where they
are raised and cared for by host parents (Isiugo-Abanihe, 1985).
3The practice has been observed in different parts of the world, such in Ivory-Coast (Ainsworth, 1992); in
Cameroon (Notermans, 2008; Verhoef, 2007); in Senegal (Vandermeersch, 2002), in Burkina-Faso (Akresh,
2007); in South Africa (Zimmerman, 2003; Cichello, 2003); in Oceania (Keesing, 1970); in Haiti (Rawson
and Beerggren, 1973); in the West Indies (Isiugo-Abanihe, 1985), but as noted by Isiugo-Abanihe (1985),
nowhere it is as institutionalized as in West African countries.
4Author’s calculation from the Cameroonian Demographic and Health Survey (2004).
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Yet, the impact of foster-children supply on the welfare of host parents’ biological chil-
dren has not been questioned by economists5. An empirical investigation appears all the
more necessary as no clear-cut conclusion can be drawn from existing theoretical models on
intra-household resource allocation (Becker, 1994; Behrman et al., 1982, 1986)6. Accord-
ing to the latter, children education is determined by several factors (preferences, returns
to education, credit constraints) which are different channels through which foster-children
supply could have an impact. If the channels are easily identified, the way they are affected
by the supply of foster-children is however less clear. For instance, depending on the initial
level of wealth of the host household as well as on the reason why children are hosted, the
credit constraints initially faced by the host household might either tighten, lessen or remain
unchanged following the arriving of the child. Since the effect of foster-children care on the
initial level of credit constraints is unclear, its final effect on biological children education
cannot be determined. Akresh (2007) is the only exception. Obtained results are however
mixed. Using original data collected at the level of a province in Burkina-Faso in 2002, the
author shows, using a child level fixed effect estimation, that young children (aged between
5-7) significantly benefit from hosting foster-children in terms of school enrollment relative
to those who do not. This is no more significant in a household level fixed effect estimation.
Concerning the eldest children (aged between 12-15), while in a child fixed effect estimation
they are found to significantly suffer from hosting foster-children in terms of school enroll-
ment relative to those who do not, in a household level fixed effect one, again, the effect
looses its significance. Middle aged children (between 8-11) do not appear to be affected by
foster-children supply in any of the specification considered.
In this paper, as in Akresh (2007), we are interested in measuring the effect of foster-
5Economic, demographic and anthropological literatures have mainly questioned the determinants of
child fostering (Isiugo-Abanihe, 1985; Ainsworth, 1992; Verhoef, 2005; Akresh, 2007; Serra, 2009) and its
impact on foster-children themselves (Ainsworth 1992; Zimmerman, 2002; Cichello, 2003; Akresh, 2004;
Eloundou-Enyegue and Shapiro, 2005; Notermans, 2008; Verhoef, 2005). Empirical evidence is however
mixed due to the difficulty to find an appropriate counter-factual.
6Besides being unconclusive, existing models on intra-household resource allocation are likely to be
irrelevant to deal with resource allocation between children in the context of African household and sibships
(Fapohunda and Todaro, 1988).
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children supply on biological children education demand of host parents. But different from
Akresh (2007), we use Cameroonian data collected at a national level and estimate the effect
of interest using a different empirical strategy to address the endogeneity of foster-children
supply in the biological children education decision. Indeed, households receiving foster-
children might be chosen by the biological parents according to characteristics that deter-
mine also their decision to educate their own children. If such characteristics are unobserved
by the researcher, then probit estimation of the effect of foster-children supply on biological
children education demand of host parents will be biased due to household level unobserved
heterogeneity. Probit estimation will also be biased if children have unobserved characteris-
tics correlated with both decisions to host a foster-child and to be educated. Akresh (2007)
addressed these issues by collecting retrospective information covering the years 1998 to 2000
concerning the child’s school enrollment history. He then compared children hosting foster-
children with children belonging to households not involved in child fostering using the school
enrollment from the year before and the year after the foster-child is supplied for the first
group and using 1999 and 2000 enrollment for the second group7. The impact of hosting a
foster-child on school enrollment is then estimated using a household fixed effects regression
to control for household level unobserved heterogeneity8. To control further for child level
unobserved heterogeneity, the author estimated also a child level fixed effect regression.
Since the information available to us has a more standard format (we do not have retro-
spective information), we deal with the unobserved heterogeneity using a different strategy.
We estimate both decisions to educate one’s biological child and to host a foster-child within
a recursive bivariate probit framework. To obtain consistent and efficient estimate of the ef-
fect of foster-children supply on biological children education demand, we estimate the model
by maximum likelihood, as a bivariate probit (Greene, 1998; 2004) and use the father’s birth
order among his brothers as our identifying variable. Indeed, the father’s birth order among
7As noted by the author, results remain similar if years 1998 and 1999 were chosen instead of 1999 and
2000.
8Difference-in-differences estimator is similar than the one obtained with fixed-effect regression.
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his brothers determines his probability to host a foster-child, at least in our context, and
does not explain his decision to educate his own children through channels we do not ob-
serve. The first point is not only inferred from existing kinship rules as highlighted by the
anthropological literature but is also supported by our descriptive statistics. In patrilineal
societies, which is the context of our analysis, kinship rules involve children to belong to the
male kin group and if they are fostered, they are likely to be sent to the father’s brothers’
home. Since a group of brothers is headed by the eldest brother, the eldest brother is more
likely to receive children fostered according to these kinship rules than all other siblings. In
our sample, we observe indeed that households headed by a male who is the eldest brother
of his sibship receive significantly more foster-children than households headed by a male
who is not. The second point is supported by the fact that the channels through which the
father’s birth order among his brothers could affect his decision to educate his own chil-
dren are observed in our dataset and thus controlled for. Through this strategy, we address
the household level unobserved heterogeneity but not the one derived from child level. We
discuss however the extent to which the latter affect the obtained results.
To estimate the model, we use data from the Cameroon Demographic and Health Survey
(CDHS) collected in 2004. Cameroon is the only country, dominated by patrilineal ethnic
groups, for which DHS gathers information on the father’s sibship size and composition and
thereby on his birth order. This dataset is therefore an unique opportunity to estimate con-
sistently and efficiently the impact of foster-children supply on biological children education
demand of host parents in patrilineal societies.
Our bivariate probit estimation results show that the probability of biological children,
aged between 10-14 years old, to attain their basic level of education decreases of about 37
percentage points when hosting school-age foster-relatives. Given the identification strategy
adopted, this suggests that households hosting school-age foster-relatives due to kinship
rules suffer from liquidity constraints preventing them from educating further their biological
children. Through this result, we highlight not only a new important determinant of hosting
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a foster-child, the birth order of the father among his sibship, but also its negative effect on
the educational attainment of host parents’ biological children.
We structure the remainder of the paper as follows. The second section presents the
conceptual framework, introducing the empirical challenges we face as well as the econometric
methodology we adopt to deal with them. The third section introduces the CHDS dataset.
The fourth section presents the estimation results and the fifth one concludes.
2 The Conceptual Framework
2.1 Empirical Issue
Estimating the effect of foster-children supply on biological children education demand of
host parents raises a potential major empirical issue: unobserved heterogeneity. Unobserved
heterogeneity is driven by the fact that households hosting foster-children differ from those
who send them on some characteristics that are unobserved and could also affect their biolog-
ical children education demand. If so, probit estimation of the effect of foster-children supply
on biological children education demand will be biased due to household level unobserved
heterogeneity, the sign of the bias depending on the correlation of the omitted household’s
characteristics with the supply of foster-children as well as with the demand for biological
children education.
To define the characteristics in which sending and receiving households could differ from
each other having in mind the different motives underlying child fostering is of particular
interest. According to Isiugo-Abanihe (1985), children are fostered for four major motives:
increase their social mobility (social mobility fostering), manage an economic shock faced by
the biological home (crisis fostering), satisfy the labor needs of the host household (domestic
fostering) and answer to the obligations and rights shared by members of a kin group and
defined by kinship rules (kinship fostering).
To increase a child’s social mobility, parents are used to relying on two main channels:
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increase his schooling and learning opportunities and enhance his access to economic, reli-
gious, political networks. Thus, households with higher resources to send children at school
or with a higher preference for child quality relative to sending households are more likely
to host children fostered for such a reason. Similarly, households headed by a leader of a
highly influential community have also a higher probability to receive children fostered to
increase the latter social mobility. Child fostering can also be driven by an economic crisis
and used as an ex-post risk management. In such a case, children are likely to be sent to
households who do not face a similar shock than the biological home or who are more able to
manage it because, for instance, their income resources are more diversified relative to those
of sending households. Children can also be sent to households with higher labor needs and
therefore asking for foster-children9. Finally, children can be exchanged between members
of a kingroup, depending on the obligations and rights they share and defined by kinship
rules. In sum, sending and host households differ from each other in terms of their resources
to send children at school, their preference for child quality, their involvement in influential
communities, their ability to manage economic shocks, their labor needs and their relative
obligations and rights as members of a kin group.
The existence of such differences between both types of households is not an issue per se
for our objective. It will be if the differences suggested are unobserved by the researcher while
determining the amount of education host households invest in their children. For instance,
part of the foster-children supply is positively related to a better access to school facilities
which should increase the ability of host households to educate their own children. If such
an access is not observed in the data and therefore omitted in a probit estimation, then the
estimated effect of foster-children supply on biological children education demand will be
up-ward biased, capturing actually the positive effect of higher access to school inputs. An
up-ward bias will also emerge if the host households’ access to influential networks is not
9As noted by Serra (2009), labor motives of host households and schooling motives of sending households
can coexist and explain the level of child fostering in an economy. Besides, even though children are hosted
to fulfill labor needs, they might still be in a better situation than they would have been if they stayed in
their biological homes (Zimmermann, 2003).
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observed while it is likely to affect positively the demand for biological children education. If
children are sent to a household to fulfill labor needs and if the latter prevent the host parents’
biological children from going to school, then probit estimation will be downward biased if
the labor needs within the household are not observed and controlled for. Since most of the
suggested characteristics in which sending and host households differ are correlated with the
latter decision to educate their own children and are unobserved, at least in our dataset,
probit estimation of the effect of foster-children supply on biological children education
demand does not appear as the best strategy to estimate consistently and efficiently the
impact of foster-children supply on biological children education demand.
Probit estimation of the effect of interest will also be biased if there is unobserved het-
erogeneity at the child level. Such heterogeneity will emerge if parents sent their children
in a household according to some characteristics of the household’s children, that are un-
observed and determine these children performance at school. For instance, one can argue
that parents prefer sending their children in a household where resident children show higher
ability at school so as foster-children benefit from positive externalities. If such abilities are
unobserved, then probit estimate of the effect of foster-children supply on biological children
education will be up-ward biased. If parents host children because of the low educational
performance of their own children, and if we do not control for it, then probit estimation
will be downward biased.
To address the bias derived from unobserved heterogeneity and obtain a consistent es-
timate of the effect of interest, we adopt a recursive bivariate probit model (Greene, 1998,
2003)10.
10The two steps procedure as described in Rivers and Vuong (1988) is appropriate to deal with the
endogeneity bias driven by unobserved heterogeneity when the suspected endogenous variable is continuous.
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2.2 Estimation Strategy
2.2.1 The Recursive Bivariate Probit Model
The demand for a biological child’s education Y and the supply of foster-children W are
described by the following latent variable models:
Y ∗ihv = β
′Xihv + δWhv + ihv (1)
W ∗hv = µ
′Qhv + υhv (2)
where Y ∗ihv is the unobservable net utility a biological child i belonging to the household h
in the village v receives from being educated. Similarly, W ∗hv is the unobservable net utility
a household h receives from hosting a foster-child. We note Xihv and Qhv two vectors of
exogenous observed characteristics affecting the decision to educate one’s biological child
and to host a foster-child respectively. To allow for the possibility that the unobserved
determinants of both decisions are correlated, we assume that the disturbance terms υhv
and ihv are jointly normally distributed with E[υhv]=E[ihv]=0, Var[υhv]= Var[ihv]=1 and
corr(υhv,ihv)= ρ.
A child will pursue his education and a household will host a foster-child if the expected
associated net utilities are positive. Y ∗ihv and W
∗
hv are related to the binary dependent
variables Yihv and Whv by the following rule:
Yihv = 1 if Y
∗
ihv≥ 0 and 0 otherwise (3)
Whv = 1 if W
∗
hv≥ 0 and 0 otherwise (4)
Equations (1)-(4) are the general specification of a recursive bivariate probit model. This
model has two interesting features. First, it is consistently and efficiently estimated, by
maximum likelihood, as a bivariate probit one as if there were no joint determination in
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the first equation (Greene, 1998, 2003). Indeed, the probabilities associated to the four
possible states of the world (Y=0 or 1 and W=0 or 1) are exactly those that enter the usual
likelihood function for the bivariate probit model. Second, it is identified even if Xihv and
Qhv include the same varying exogenous regressors (Wilde, 2000). Indeed, the non-linearity
of both equations of the model ensures, theoretically, its identification. In other words, we
do not need to define an exclusion restriction on Qhv, that is a variable included in Qhv but
not in Xihv, to identify the model
11. However, as argued by Monfardini and Radice (2008),
this result strongly relies on the assumption of normal distribution. Therefore, in practice it
is better to introduce an exclusion restriction since it might help in making the estimation
results more robust to distributional misspecification. We call such a variable Z.
2.2.2 Identification hypothesis
In our context, Z will be a relevant exclusion restriction if it explains the household’s
decision to host a foster-child but does not explain the biological child’s decision to pursue
his education through channels, besides the presence of foster-children, we do not observe and
control for (Deaton, 2009). Said differently, Z has to be uncorrelated with the unobserved
determinants of the biological child’s education decision noted, here, ihv.
Given our previous discussion on child fostering motives, Z cannot include determinants of
social mobility or crisis fostering or even domestic labor fostering since the characteristics of
households receiving children for these purposes are also potential unobserved determinants
of their demand for biological children education. On the contrary, we believe that Z can
include determinants of kinship fostering. Kinship fostering involves children to be exchanged
among kinsmen according to the obligations and rights they share and defined by kinship
rules (Isiugo-Abanihe, 1985). We propose to infer from these rules which member of a kin
group is more likely to receive foster-children. According to these rules, a group of brothers
11The statement of Maddala (1983), suggesting that the parameters of the second equation are not
identified if Qhv includes all the variables in Xihv is misleading. As noticed by Wilde (2000), it is only valid
when Qhv and Xihv are both constants (in Monfardini and Radice, 2008).
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from the male kin group is more likely to receive children in patrilineal societies because
children are considered to be part of the male’s kin group and not of the female’s one (La
Ferrara, 2007; Taiwo, 2007). Since such a group is usually headed by the eldest brother,
the latter should receive more children fostered according to the kinship rules than all of his
other siblings. In contrast, a group of sisters from the female kin group is more likely to
receive children in matrilineal societies because children belong to the female’s kin group and
not to the male’s one. Since a group of sisters is headed by the eldest one, the latter should
receive more children fostered according to the kinship rules than all of her other siblings
(Taiwo, 2007)12. In other words, sending and host households differ from each other on an
additional characteristic: the birth order of the father among his brothers (respectively, of
the mother among her sisters) in patrilineal societies (respectively, in matrilineal societies).
In Cameroon, a country where most of the ethnic groups are patrilineal, we should
therefore observe that households headed by a male who is the eldest of his brothers receive
more children than households headed by a male who is not, if children are fostered according
to the kinship rules13. We propose in table2 to compare the number of foster-children hosted
by the households of our children sample depending on whether the male care-giver is the
eldest of his brothers or not. As we will explain latter, we are interested in 925 biological
children aged between 10-14 years old belonging to 604 households. 329 of them are headed
by a male care-giver who is the eldest of his brothers and 275 are headed by a male care-
giver who is not14. The number of foster-children measured is the number of foster-children
aged between 6 to 14 years old (school-age) and reported as being relatives (other than
12Actually, in matrilineal societies, this is the eldest brother of a group of sisters who head the group (La
Ferrara, 2007). However, children are used to be sent to the eldest sister, in particular the orphans (Taiwo,
2007). Taiwo (2007) uses this implicit-child rearing practice to identify the effect of maternal orphans supply
on fertility and biological children health in matrilineal ethnic groups of Malawi.
13According to the ethnographic atlas of Murdoch initiated in 1967 and regularly updated, the ethnic
groups in Cameroon are all patrilineal except the Kom living in the North West of the country.
14They are children raised at least by their biological mother, according to the fertility survey, and for
which information on the birth order of their male care-giver is available. At 85 percent, the male care-giver
(the head) is the father of the children considered, otherwise he is a step-father. The male care-giver’s birth
order is determined relative to his sibship members who are alive at the date of the survey.
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foster-grand-children) of the male care-giver15.
Within this sample, as expected, households headed by a male who is the eldest of his
brothers host in average more school-age foster-relatives (other than foster-grand children)
than the others. Precisely, the former host in average 0.131 of these children while the
latter host in average 0,076. The difference is significant at ten percent level. It appears
further that households of the first group host in average less school-age foster-non-relatives
compared to households of the second group. The difference is also significant at ten percent
level. This is consistent with the anthropoligical-based assumption that children belonging
to the male kin group and fostered according to the kinship rules are likely to be sent to the
home of the father’s eldest brother while there is no reason for this to be true for children
who do not belong to the kin group.
If these statistics validate our strategy to explain the foster-children supply in Cameroon
by one determinant of kinship fostering, the male care-giver’s birth order among his brothers,
this is not sufficient to ensure the identification of the model. Indeed, the latter implies
further that the male care-giver’s birth order among his brothers does not affect his decision
to educate his own children through channels, besides the foster-children supply, we do not
observe and thereby captured by the error term, here, ihv. Households headed by a male
who is either the eldest of his brothers or who is not are likely to differ from each other on
characteristics that could have an impact on their decision to educate their own biological
children. First, both types of households are likely to differ on demographic characteristics
basically because of life-cycle reasons. In particular, households headed by a male who is
the eldest of his brothers are likely to have more biological children than the others simply
because there are headed by older men. If the number of children is associated with lower
amount of education invested in children (Becker and Lewis, 1973), then children belonging
to households headed by a male care-giver who is the eldest of his brothers should receive
15We do not consider neither the foster-grand-children nor the foster-non relatives because our identifi-
cation hypothesis is relevant in the case of children being relatives of the male care-giver (since by this way
they belong to the male kin group) other than grand-children (since children are fostered among the father’s
brothers and not to grand-parents.
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less education than other children. Both types of households are also likely to differ in terms
of the level of education attained by the male care-giver. First-born children are likely to
receive less education than their later-born siblings because they are used to be asking by
their parents to help them in taking care of the younger. If so, children whose male care-giver
is the eldest of his brothers should receive less education than children whose male care-giver
is not since they belong to lower educated households and since lower educated care-givers
might have a lower preference for child quality and/or lower resources to devote to children’s
education. Besides, if accumulated wealth increases with age, then older siblings should
be wealthier than younger ones. If so, children whose male care-giver is the eldest of his
brothers should receive more education than children whose male care-giver is not since they
belong to wealthier households and since wealth is associated with lower credit constraints
and opportunity costs of education.
We propose in table2 to compare both types of households on the three above-metionned
characteristics. The number of ever-born children is measured by the number of pregnancies
a male care-giver’s wife, who resides in the household, ever had and we also compute the
number of dead children to see whether patterns of child mortality differ between both types
of households. As expected, households headed by a male who is the eldest of his brothers
have on average more pregnancies than other households and the difference is significant. The
difference in the number of dead children is however not. The male care-giver’s education
is measured by his educational attainment which is a 6-ordered dummy variable from no
education (0) to higher education (5). As expected households headed by a male who is the
eldest of his brothers attained a lower level of education than the others and the difference
is again significant. A similar pattern is observed if we measure the wife’s level of education
attained16. In terms of accumulated wealth, proxied using the wealth indicator calculated
by DHS, if the difference in the measure between both types of households is significant, the
sign is however not the one expected. This suggests that accumulated wealth is determined
16Note that in polygynous households, the wife’s education measured is the one of the first spouse.
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more by education than by age.
Since the three channels through which the male care-giver’s birth order among his broth-
ers could affect his demand for his own children education are measured in our dataset, we
include them in Xihv (as well as in Qihv) to control for their effect. By this way, we ensure the
relevance of our identification strategy and can define our exclusion variable Z as a binary
variable that equals one if the household’s male care-giver is the eldest of his brothers and
zero otherwise. Using such a variable to identify our model enables us to capture household
level unobserved heterogeneity but the one defined at the child level. We discuss however
the extent to which the latter could affect the obtained results.
3 The Data
3.1 The CDHS 2004
To our knowledge, Cameroon Demographic and Health Survey (2004) is the only survey
implemented in Africa providing information on the sibship size and composition of the male
care-givers17. Since most ethnic groups living in Cameroon are patrilineal, the availability
of such information is an unique opportunity to identify the effect of foster-children supply
on biological children education in the country.
For the purpose of our analysis, we focus on a sample of usual resident children who
are the biological children of the female spouse according to the fertility history. For 85
percent of them, they are also the biological children of the male care-giver (the household’s
head), otherwise the male care-giver is the step-father18. We then reduce this biological
children sample to the one for which information on the sibship size and composition of the
male care-giver is available. Only a subsample of males are indeed interviewed on this item:
one household on two is first picked up for the male interview; and among the picked-up
17Females in DHS are systematically interviewed on this item, but not males.
18This information is obtained given the relationship reported between the the male care-giver and the
child and the number of unions reported by the interviewed mother.
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households, eligible men, that is men who are residents of the household and aged less than
59 years old, are interviewed (Cameroon DHS report, 2004; p 12.)19. Since we are interested
in explaining basic level of education attainment, which corresponds to the 5th level of
primary education, we finally focus on biological children aged between 10 and 14 years old
which yields to a sample size of 925 observations. Indeed, according to the Cameroonian
educational system, all children of 10 years old should have attained their basic level of
education unless they repeated one or more grades or started schooling with delays.
The CDHS has an additional interesting feature: the roster provides information on the
residence and survival status of biological parents of all household members less than 17
years. From this, we define non-biological children as any household member, less than
17 years, whose both biological parents are absent from the household where they reside.
Foster-children are then defined as non-biological children whose both biological parents
are absent but alive. We exploit further the relationship between the identified foster-child
and the household’s head as reported by the latter to determine whether the foster-child
is a grand-child, or an other relative or a brother/sister of the household’s head or a non-
relative. Such distinctions might be interesting as the relative genetic closeness between the
household’s head and the reared child might influence the behavior of the former toward the
latter (Hamilton 1964a, 1964b; Case et al., 2001; Cox, 2007).
3.2 Descriptive Statistics
According to table3, 18 percent of the biological children of our sample host one (or
more) foster-child aged between 0-17 years old. Since the biological children education
is more likely to be affected by the presence of school-age foster-children, because both
of these children will compete for the same educational resources, we focus on school-age
foster-children, that is foster-children aged between 6-14 years old. 10.16 percent of the
19Reducing the sample in such a way leads finally to consider only children living in their household
with both parents and omit those whose father or male care-giver is absent either due to death, divorce or
migration.
15Document de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2009.49
biological children considered host one (or more) school-age foster-child. It appears further
that 30 percent of the hosted school-aged foster-children are relatives of the household’s
head other than grand-children. Put it differently, biological children are more likely to host
school-age foster-relatives other than foster-grand-children, or foster-brothers and sisters or
foster-non relatives. We therefore focus on the impact of school-age foster-relatives other
than grand-children supply on biological children education demand. In the following, for
sake of simplicity, school-age foster-relatives refer to school-age foster-relatives other than
foster-grand-children. The proportion of school-age foster-relatives among the hosted foster-
children is not the only argument for such a focus. Our identification hypothesis is relevant
to explain these children supply more than the one of grand-children, or brother or sisters
or of non-relatives20.
In table4, we provide descriptive statistics for the whole sample of biological children
considered as well as for two sub-samples depending on whether the biological child hosts a
school-age foster-relative or not. The difference in the educational outcomes is particularly
striking between both sub-samples. While 87 percent of the biological children who do not
host any school-age foster-relative are enrolled in school, 100 percent of those hosting one or
more are. Similarly, while 47 percent of the biological children who do not host any school-
age foster-relative have attained the 5th level of primary education, that is the basic level of
education, 63 percent of those hosting one or more have.
Such differences might be explained by factors other than the presence of school-age
foster-relatives in the household. Indeed, the two sub-samples differ from each other on
several individual, household and community level characteristics. For instance, there are
more males than females in the sub-sample of biological children hosting one (or more)
20Although we are not interested in this paper in their particular impact, we are able to identify orphans
and can count the number of them hosted by the biological children of our sample. Defining single-orphans
as non-biological children whose a biological parent is dead and the other absent and double-orphans as
non-biological children whose both biological parents are dead, we observe that 3.7 percent of the biological
children of our sample host one (or more) single-orphan aged between 0-17 and less than 3 host one (more)
double-orphan of 0-17 years old. In other words, biological children are more likely to host foster-children
than orphans, either single or double which explains our focus on the impact of foster-children supply on
biological children welfare instead of the one of orphans.
16Document de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2009.49
school-age foster-relative. This could explain the differences observed in terms of educational
outcomes between both sub-samples if parents invest more heavily in the education of their
sons relative to their daughters, either because boys have a higher returns to education
or because of a preference for sons (Becker, 1994; Behrman et al., 1982, 1986). Wealth
and parental education differ also significantly between both sub-samples. More precisely,
children hosting school-age foster-relatives have in average more educated parents as well as a
higher wealth index than children who do not. Since children education is positively related
to the wealth of the household they live in as well as to the education of their biological
parents, these characteristics are further explaining factors for the differences observed in
terms of school enrollment and basic education attainment between both samples. These
characteristics are therefore important to control for to avoid omitted variable bias. Besides,
as already mentioned, wealth and care givers’ education (and in particular the male’s one)
are potentially correlated with the decision to host a foster-child. Then accounting for them
is also crucial to avoid biases derived from unobserved heterogeneity.
4 Results
4.1 Biprobit Estimation Results
To obtain a consistent estimate of the effect of foster-children supply (W ) on biological
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Given the model specification, this can be written
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where BVN denotes the cumulative distribution function of the bivariate normal distribution
and β, δ, µ and ρ are the parameters to be estimated.
The education measure we adopt, Y , is a dummy variable that equals one if the biological
child’s has attained the 5th level of primary education that is his basic level of education at
the date of the interview and zero otherwise. It is explained by X, a vector of exogenous
observed characteristics, and by W which measures the presence of school-age foster-relatives
in the household h. The equation (2) explains the presence of a school-age foster-relative in
the household h by Q, which includes household level characteristics already accounted in
X and our exclusion restriction Z.
At the individual level, X includes the biological child’s gender and age. If parents have
a pro-male bias or if boys have higher returns to education than girls, we expect girls to
have a lower probability to reach basic level of education than boys. We expect also that the
probability to attain the basic level of education increases with the child’s age due to grade
repetition and late entry at school.
At the household level, we include in X and Q measures of the parents’s educational
attainment and of the household’s wealth. As already noticed, the parents’ educational
attainment is measured by a 6-ordered dummy variable from no education (0) to higher
education (5)21. We expect that the higher is the level of education they attained, the
higher is the level of education their children reach, either due to an income channel or
due to the preference one. We expect also that households headed by educated parents are
more likely to host school-age foster-relatives sent for social mobility purpose. Since the
DHS does not measure neither the household’s income nor its expenditure, the household’s
21For polygynous households, the educational attainment of the mother is the one of the first spouse.
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living standard is captured by the wealth index as calculated by DHS22. We expect that
the household’s wealth determines positively the biological child’s basic level of education
attainment since wealth is associated with lower credit constraints and opportunity coast of
education. It might also be positively related to the presence of school-age foster-relatives
if the latter are sent to wealthier households to increase their social mobility or to manage
an economic shock. Note that including in X the educational level attained by the male
care-giver as well as a household’s wealth indicator are all the more necessary as there are
potential channels, besides the foster-children supply one, through which our identifying
variable could affect the biological child’s level of education attainment.
X and Q include also a measure of the mother’s decision power regarding large household
purchase. The latter is measured by a dummy variable that equals one if the mother alone
has the final say about large household purchase and zero otherwise23. According to intra-
household resource allocation models, the higher is the mother’s power to allocate resources,
the higher resources are invested in children welfare (Thomas, 1995). We therefore expect a
positive effect of the mother’s decision power regarding large household purchase on biological
children education. We expect also that such a decision power has a positive effect on the
probability to host a school-age foster-relative. Indeed, parents who are looking at fostering
their children to increase their education are likely to observe the behavior of potential host
parents toward their children to select the best place to send their own children24. The
mother’s decision power regarding household purchase is a good indicator to look at for
these parents since it is associated with higher resources devoted to children welfare25. We
include also the mother’s and the father’s age in X and Q.
22This is a 5-ordered dummy variable ranging households from poorest to richest obtained from a principal
component analysis based on their possessions. The advantage of such a wealth measure is that it is likely
to be exogenous, material welfare being determined before the arriving of foster-children.
23For polygynous households, the decision power of the mother is the one of the first spouse.
24An indicator of educational investment made in children prior to the arriving of a child would be ideal.
Unfortunately, such indicators are not provided in the DHS dataset.
25Besides, there is no obvious reason for a change in the mother’s decision power with the arriving of a
foster-child which ensures the exogeneity of the variable. Regarding this measure, however, one could argue
that the higher is the power of a mother in a household, the lower will be the supply of foster-children coming
from the husband’s kin group because the mother is expected to favor her biological children.
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Following the quantity-quality trade-off theory, the amount of education received by a
child should decrease with the number of children (Becker and Lewis, 1973). We therefore
include in X the number of pregnancies the male care-giver’s spouse(s) had at the date of the
survey and expect a negative correlation of the variable with the biological child’s 5th level
of education attainment26. Again, the number of pregnancies is also important to control for
since it is likely to be an other channel through which our identifying variable could affect
the educational attainment of the host parents’ biological child. We also include this variable
in Q and assume that foster-children supply decreases with the number of pregnancies, in
particular, if they are fostered to wealthier and more educated households.
To characterize further the household size, we include the number of household members
excluded the number of non-biological children both in X and Q. This variable measures the
effect of remaining members in the household on children level of education attainment27. If
part of the remaining household members works, their number should enhance the biological
child’s school level attainment. If part of the remaining household members has joined the
household due to some (unobserved) characteristics that explain also the supply of foster-
children, we should expect a positive relation between the former and the presence of school-
age foster-relatives in the household.
Given the diversity of the ethnic groups in Cameroon, we introduced dummies to identify
them both inX and inQ. Following the ethnic classification of the DHS report for Cameroon,
we construct 11 ethnic groups to characterize whether the child belongs to the arabe ethnic
group, the bui mandara, the adama, the bantoide of the south west, the grassfield, the
bamilike bamoun, the cotier, the beti, the kako, to an other or an unknown ethnic groups.
Taking as reference group belonging to the bamilike-bamoun (the most dynamic ethnic group
located, mostly, in the littoral), we question whether belonging to the 10 other ethnic groups
26For polygynous households, the number of pregnancies is the number of pregnancies every resident
spouses had at the date of the interview.
27Around 19 percent of the children of the sample belong to a polygynous household (two or more spouses
resident in the household). For these households, part of the number of remaining household members
captures the presence of additional female spouses and of their own children.
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enhances or not biological children educational attainment. Included in the same way in Q,
we wonder whether some ethnic groups are more likely to host children relative to others.
The mother’s religion is also taken into account both in X and in Q. 5 dummies are created
to characterize whether the child’s mother is catholic, protestant, muslim, animist, or has
an other religion (including no religion)28.
At the community level, X and Q include a dummy variable to characterize whether
the household is in a rural location or not. Children living in urban location are more
likely to reach basic level of education than children in rural location, due to a better access
to school inputs. We expect also a negative correlation between the rural location of a
household and the presence of school-age foster-relatives if the latter are sent to increase
their access to schooling inputs. 10 regional dummies are also introduced in both equations:
Adamaoua, Centre, East, Extreme North, North, North West, West, South West, Yaounde.
The reference group we adopt is the littoral region29.
Q further includes the exclusion restriction Z we define above, that is whether the male
care-giver of the household is the eldest his brothers. We control besides for the number of
his living brothers and sisters to ensure that we capture the fact that the male care-giver is
the eldest of his brothers and not simply of his sibship.
Q includes also measures of a household’s labor needs since, as already argued, satisfying
the labor needs of a household is one motive underlying child fostering. Precisely, we expect
that foster-children supply increases with such needs. To measure a household’s labor needs,
as in Zimmerman (2003), we consider the number of men present in the household assuming
that the presence of more men increases the shadow value of domestic labor through the
increase of the demand for home-produced goods. Thus, we should observe a positive relation
between the presence of school-age foster-relatives and the number of men. We measure the
28Since there is no biological child hosting school-age foster-relatives being without religion, we do not
include this characteristics among the explaining factor of the decision to host a school-age foster-relative
and consider only the characteristic being of an other religion.
29We do not include in Q the dummy living in region 5 since, according to the descriptive statistics, we
do not observe any biological child hosting a school-age foster-relative with this characteristic.
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latter by the number of men resident in the household and aged between 24 and 59 years
old. A dummy to characterize whether the household is polygynous, that is whether there
are more than two spouses in the household or not is also introduced. The intuition behind
this is that polygyny is often explained by higher labor supply needs (Adepoju, 1999). We
assume therefore, under the labor motives hypothesis, that the demand for foster-children
is positively correlated with polygyny (unless the polygyny structure has satisfied the labor
needs). Both of these variables are also included in X to further account for household’s size
and composition and its impact on a biological child’s level of educational attainment30.
4.1.1 Probit results
Although the estimation is likely to be biased, we propose to estimate equation (1)
in probit. Results are presented in table5. To ease the interpretation of the estimated
coefficients, marginal effects are also computed and reported in the last two columns. All
estimations are clustered at the household level.
Hosting a school-age foster-relative has no significant effect on biological children educa-
tional attainment. The related marginal effect is near from zero (-0,007). In other words,
biological children do not seem to suffer or benefit in terms of basic educational attainment
from the presence of school-age foster-relatives. This suggests that households receiving
these children are involved in such a practice due to their higher ability to care for addi-
tional children.
Concerning the control variables, as expected, the probability of a child to attain his
basic level of education increases with his age, his parents’ level of education attained, his
household’s wealth, and his mother’s age. Children who are catholic, protestant and those
30As already mentioned, households with higher ability to manage economic shocks are also more likely
to host school-age foster-relatives. Measures of such an ability do not exist in our dataset. We would like
to introduce measures of the male care-giver’s occupation, arguing that children whose father is either a
clerical, or a civil servant, or a professor, or in the armed force relative to working as a farmer or in factory
or being unemployed are less sensitive to economic shocks. The first fourth work categories could also
be thought as measures of the higher connection of a household to influential communities which should
increase the probability to host a child fostered to increase his social mobility. Unfortunately, there are too
few observations of male care-givers belonging to one of these work categories.
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belonging to other religions are more likely to attain this level of education than children
who are muslim (the reference group). Surprisingly, it appears that the more decision power
has the mother about large household purchase, the less educated is the child. Relative to
children who belong to the bamilike bamoun ethnic group (the reference group), children
from the the other ethnic groups are significantly less likely to reach their basic education.
4.1.2 Bivariate Probit Results
Table6 presents the bivariate probit results of equation (1) (the biological children edu-
cation equation). While non-significant in probit estimation, the effect of school-age foster-
relatives supply on the probability of biological children to attain their 5th level of primary
education is significantly negative in bivariate probit. In other words, biological children
significantly suffer from the presence of school-age foster-relatives in terms of educational
attainment, once the unobserved heterogeneity between receiving and sending households is
taken into account. Computing the related marginal effect, we find that a biological child
moving from a situation where he does not host a school-age foster-relative to a situation
where he does decreases his probability to attain his 5th level of primary education of 37
percentage point. The estimated effect of the other variables in bivariate probit is rather
similar than the one obtained in probit except that the negative effect of the number of
pregnancies becomes significant while the negative effect of the mother’s power looses its
significance in bivariate probit.
Table7 presents the bivariate probit results of equation (2) (the school-age foster-relative
supply equation). As expected, whether the father is the eldest of his brothers determines
positively and significantly the presence of a school-age foster-relative in the household. This
ensures that the model is correctly identified. The decision to host a school-age foster-relative
is also positively and significantly related to the spouse’s education and of her decision power
regarding large household purchase. Relative to muslims (the reference group), catholics,
protestants and anismists are more likely to host a school-age foster-relative. Relative to the
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bamilike-bamoun (the reference group), households from the beti and other (or unknown)
ethnic groups are also more likely to host a school-age foster-relative.
Comparing both estimations in probit and in bivariate probit, it appears that the effect
of foster-children supply on biological children education demand is upward biased in probit.
4.2 Interpretation of the bivariate probit estimate
According to the likelihood ratio statistic test in table6, we reject the hypothesis that
ρ equals zero. This suggests that the two decisions are correlated, making the estimation
of the effect of foster-children supply on biological children education demand in bivariate
probit appropriate. The Wald test for the same hypothesis leads to the same conclusion: the
estimate of ρ is 0.5536, with a standard error of 0.23. The Wald statistic for the test of the
hypothesis that ρ equals zero is (0.5536/0.23) = 5,79. For a single restriction, the critical
value from the chi-squared table is 3.84, so the hypothesis is again rejected31.
To interpret the results obtained, the identification strategy should be recalled back. By
adopting the father’s birth order among his brothers as our identifying variable, we explain
only a part of the foster-children supply. Precisely we explain the presence of foster-children
supplied according to the kinship rules. Therefore, the estimated negative effect of foster-
children supply on biological children basic level of educational attainment, obtained in
bivariate probit, concerns biological children hosting foster-children sent according to these
rules. These biological children suffer from the presence of foster-children because the latter
are not hosted because of altruism, or higher ability of the household to care for them, but
because the father has to host them due to his position within the kin group. And this might
31Note that not rejecting the hypothesis that both decisions are uncorrelated does not suggest that the
model is better estimated in probit than in bivariate probit. Indeed, this test is not a strict exogeneity one.
Greene (2003), using a similar framework to determine the effect of a program on women’s studies on the
presence of a gender economics course in a liberal arts college’s course offerings, cannot reject the absence
of correlation between the two decisions. Nonetheless, he maintains that ”‘Surely, the gender economics and
womens studies are highly correlated, but this finding does not contradict that proposition”’, p717. Instead,
ρ measures the correlation between the disturbances in the equations, the omitted factors (Greene, 1998,
2003; Rhine et al., 2004). That is, ρ measures (roughly) the correlation between the outcomes after the
influence of the included factors is accounted for.
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tighten the liquidity constraints faced by the household preventing the biological children of
host parents from pursuing further their own education.
Note that our identification strategy does not permit to control for child level unobserved
heterogeneity. Since the bias derived from the latter can be either positive or negative, it
is therefore difficult to assess the way it could affect our estimated effect. However, we can
still derive some intuitions from the work of Akresh (2007). He shows indeed that the effect
of foster-children supply on the probability of biological children aged between 12-15 years
old to be enrolled in school is positive although near from zero in the household fixed effect
estimation and becomes significantly negative in the child level fixed effect one. This suggests
that omitting to control for child level unobserved heterogeneity upward biases the effect of
interest32. If a similar bias is at work in our study, the effect of foster-children supply on
biological children education demand should be all the more negative.
4.3 Robustness checks
The robustness checks aim at testing the extent to which the father’s birth order among
his brothers is a relevant exclusion restriction for identifying our model. As already argued,
its relevance depends on whether or not we control for the channels, besides the foster-
children supply one, through which it could affect the biological child’s education demand.
We propose in table9 to compare households headed by a male who is either the eldest of his
brothers or not on further characteristics such as the number of the male care giver’s living
brothers and sisters; the number of the mother’s living brothers and sisters; the number
of living daughters33; and the number of school-age orphans hosted34; and on some wealth
32Such a bias might emerge if households send their children to households with children showing higher
abilities at school.
33They are the mother’s daughters and for mothers married more than once, some of these daughters are
actually the male care-giver’s step-daughters. If a household counts more than one female spouse, we sum
the number of living daughters of each resident spouse to obtain a number at the level of a household.
34They are either single or double orphans, defined either as the household’s head grand-children, or
brother or sister, or other relative or non relative. The difference remains significant if we consider the
number of orphans aged between 0-17.
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indicators in replacement of the wealth index calculated by DHS35.
We observe that both types of households differ significantly from each other on the
number of the male care-giver’s brothers; on the number of living daughters; on the material
used to construct the household and on whether the household has a bicycle or not; and
a motorcycle or not. Since these characteristics are likely to affect the probability of a
biological child to attain his 5th level of education, we have to control for their effect in X
to ensure the relevance of our exclusion variable and the identification of the model (there
are also included in Q)36. Indeed, as already argued in Lloyd and Blanc (1996), a child’s
educational performance in developing countries is determined not only by the characteristics
of his parents but also of his extended family. The higher is a child’s number of father’s
brothers, the higher resources might be within the male kin group and the higher resources
can be pooled and shared for children education. If so, a positive effect is expected between
the number of the father’s brothers and the biological child’s probability to attain his 5th
level of education. If the expected returns to education of sons is higher than the one of
daughters and if credit constraints are biding; or if parents have a preference for sons relative
to daughters, then the higher is the number of living daughters among the living children,
the higher should be the education invested in a child (Becker, 1994; Behrman et al., 1982,
1986). Under these conditions, we expect that the number of living daughters, given the
number of pregnancies, increases the child’s probability to attain his 5th level of education.
We assume further that children belonging to households whose floor is constructed using
cement have higher educational outcomes than the those belonging to household whose floor
is constructed using other materials (including earth and wood). Similarly, children whose
households have a motorcycle are expected to have higher educational outcomes than others
if only wealthier households are able to buy motorcycles 37.
35In table8, we provide descriptive statistics of these variables for the biological children samples.
36The number of the male care-giver’s brothers and sisters are already included in Q in the initial model.
37We include in the robustness checks only a dummy for whether the household has a motorcycle since
the correlation between having a motorcycle and having a bicycle is high (it equals 0,75). Note that we do
not find any significant difference between both types of households on having or not a radio, a TV set, a
refrigerator, a car or a truck, or a phone.
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We summarize in table10 the estimated effect of our exclusion restriction Z on the prob-
ability to host a school-age foster-relative (equation 2) and the estimated effect of the latter
supply on the probability of a biological child to attain his 5th level of primary education
(equation 1), after the inclusion of the three sets of additional controls38. We include first
each of the three sets of controls separately and then there are all included in the estima-
tion model. As observed in table10, the estimated effect of the father’s birth order within
his male sibship on the probability to host a school-age foster-relative remains positive and
significant in the fourth specifications. Interestingly, the number of living daughters has a
significant negative effect on the probability to host a school-age foster-relative (controlling
for the number of pregnancies)39. This suggests that the gender-composition of a host sib-
ship matters in the decision to host a foster-child. The estimated effect of foster-children
supply on biological children 5th level of education attainment appears also robust to the
introduction of these three sets of additional controls. If the household owns a motorcycle,
it increases significantly the child’s probability to attain his 5th level of education40.
5 Conclusion
We estimate the spillover effects of hosting school-age foster-relatives on the probability
of biological children to attain their 5th level of primary education (basic level of educa-
tion) in Cameroon. To address the unobserved heterogeneity between sending and receiving
households leading probit estimation to be biased, we estimate a recursive bivariate probit
model. To identify the latter, we use the father’s birth order within his male sibship arguing
that in patrilineal societies, eldest brothers are more likely to receive children due to their
position within the kin group than all other of his siblings. Estimated in bivariate probit, we
find that hosting school-age foster-relatives significantly decreases the probability of biologi-
38The estimation result of the whole model for each robustness checks can be provided upon request.
39Not shown. It is significant both in the specification where the variable is included alone and in the
specification where all the three sets of variables are included.
40Not shown. It is significant both in the specification where the variable is included alone and in the
specification where all the three sets of variables are included.
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cal children to attain their basic level of education. We interpret this result as evidence that
households hosting school-age foster-relatives because they have to, due to the obligations
of the household’s head derived from his position within his kin group, suffer from liquidity
constraints preventing them from educating further their own children. Although we cannot
control for child level unobserved heterogeneity, we argue that the effect should be all the
more negative once accounting for it. Note that our results are obtained for a sample of
biological children living a stable households, that is in a household with two parents since
the presence of the male care-giver is one condition for obtaining information on his birth
order.
This result show that the spillover effects of hosting foster-children on biological children
education depend crucially on the motives underlying their presence in a household.
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Table 1: Percentage of Foster-Children in 11 West African countries1
Country Year Percentage of Foster-children Number of Children less than
14 years old
Benin 2001 10.7 14388
Burkina Faso 2003 5.9 27900
Ghana 1998 13.2 9379
Guinee 2005 10.2 18243
Ivory Coast 2005 12.1 10069
Liberia 2007 16.8 16095
Mali 2006 7.1 36153
Niger 2006 7.6 24834
Nigeria 1999 6.7 17037
Senegal 2006 10.3 28459
Togo 1998 11.8 19169
All 11 countries 9.5 227195
Source: Author’s calculation and DHS Reports
aThe information is not provided for Gambia, Cap-Verde, Guinea-Bissau and Sierra-Leone.
Table 2: Characteristics of households headed by a male who is either the eldest of his
brothers or who is not and where biological children of 10-14 years old are present
Father is the eldest brother Father is not the eldest Test of
brother Significance
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. N (1) - (2)
(1) (2) 1
N. foster relative 0.131 0.453 329 0.076 0.304 275 +*
6-14 hosted
N. foster non relative 0.003 0.055 329 0.018 0.134 275 -*
6-14 hosted
N. pregnancies2 7.191 3.717 329 6.436 2.882 275 +***
N. dead children 1.03 1.446 329 0.873 1.131 275 +
Father’s Educ. 1.772 1.377 329 2.142 1.459 275 -***
Mother’s Educ. 1.359 1.237 329 1.622 1.282 275 -**
Wealth Index 2.733 1.397 329 3.105 1.465 275 -***
a* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The test of significance of mean difference is done given unequal variance.
bDemographic variables are calculated at the household level (not at the mother’s one).
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Table 3: Percentage of biological children of our sample hosting foster-children, by age and
relationship
Variable Mean S. D. N
Perc. of biological children hosting non-biological child(ren) 0-17 0,2184 0,41 925
Perc. of biological children hosting foster-child(ren) 0-17 0,1729 0,37 925
Perc. of biological children hosting foster-child(ren) 6-14 0,1016 0,30 925
Prop. of foster-grand-child(ren) among the hosted foster-children 6-14 0,0445 0,19 202
Prop. of foster-other relative(s) among the hosted foster-children 6-14 0,2970 0,43 202
Prop. of foster-brother/sister(s) among the hosted foster-children 6-14 0,0544 0,23 202
Prop. of foster-non relative(s) among the hosted foster-children 6-14 0,0198 0,14 202
Perc. of biological children hosting single-orphan(s) 0-17 0,0367 0,18 925
Perc. of biological children hosting double-orphan(s) 0-17 0,0237 0,15 925
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of the Biological Children Sample
Whole Sample With school-age Without school-age
Foster-relative 1 Foster-relative
Variable Mean S. D. Obs Mean S. D. Obs Mean S. D. Obs
enrollment 0,8806 0,32 921 1,0000 0,00 69 0,8709 0,34 852
5th level attained 0,4789 0,50 925 0,6232 0,49 69 0,4673 0,50 856
gender (female) 0,4778 0,50 925 0,4058 0,49 69 0,4836 0,50 856
age 11,8335 1,43 925 11,7246 1,36 69 11,8423 1,43 856
Mother’s age2 36,8205 5,97 925 37,3768 5,34 69 36,7757 6,02 856
Father’s age 44,7730 7,15 925 43,7536 6,95 69 44,8551 7,17 856
Mother’s educ. 1,4314 1,27 925 2,1594 1,30 69 1,3727 1,24 856
Father’s educ. 1,9114 1,43 925 2,5217 1,39 69 1,8622 1,42 856
Wealth index 2,9027 1,45 925 3,5072 1,48 69 2,8540 1,44 856
N. pregnancies per HH3 7.4821 3.97 925 6.2173 3.23 69 7.5841 4.01 856
N. HH members 4 8,3092 3,85 925 7,8696 2,95 69 8,3446 3,91 856
Catholic 0,3496 0,48 924 0,5072 0,50 69 0,3368 0,47 855
Protestant 0,3463 0,48 924 0,4058 0,49 69 0,3415 0,47 855
Muslim 0,1764 0,38 924 0,0290 0,17 69 0,1883 0,39 855
Animist 0,0465 0,21 924 0,0435 0,21 69 0,0468 0,21 855
No religion 0,0509 0,22 924 0,0000 0,00 69 0,0550 0,23 855
Other religion 0,0303 0,17 925 0,0145 0,12 69 0,0315 0,17 856
Rural 0,5751 0,49 925 0,4638 0,50 69 0,5841 0,49 856
regiond1 0,0930 0,29 925 0,0580 0,24 69 0,0958 0,29 856
regiond2 0,0681 0,25 925 0,1449 0,35 69 0,0619 0,24 856
regiond3 0,0768 0,27 925 0,1449 0,35 69 0,0713 0,26 856
regiond4 0,0681 0,25 925 0,1014 0,30 69 0,0654 0,25 856
regiond5 0,1276 0,33 925 0,0000 0,00 69 0,1379 0,34 856
regiond6 0,0681 0,25 925 0,0580 0,24 69 0,0689 0,25 856
regiond7 0,1362 0,34 925 0,0725 0,26 69 0,1414 0,35 856
regiond8 0,0778 0,27 925 0,1159 0,32 69 0,0748 0,26 856
regiond9 0,0832 0,28 925 0,1159 0,32 69 0,0806 0,27 856
regiond10 0,0746 0,26 925 0,0145 0,12 69 0,0794 0,27 856
regiond11 0,0638 0,24 925 0,0870 0,28 69 0,0619 0,24 856
regiond12 0,0627 0,24 925 0,0870 0,28 69 0,0607 0,24 856
arabe 0,0789 0,27 925 0,0145 0,12 69 0,0841 0,28 856
bui mandara 0,1405 0,35 925 0,0435 0,21 69 0,1484 0,36 856
adama 0,1546 0,36 925 0,1449 0,35 69 0,1554 0,36 856
bamilike bamoun 0,2141 0,41 925 0,1884 0,39 69 0,2161 0,41 856
bantoide south west 0,0259 0,16 925 0,0145 0,12 69 0,0269 0,16 856
grassfiled 0,0789 0,27 925 0,1449 0,35 69 0,0736 0,26 856
cotier 0,0389 0,19 925 0,0290 0,17 69 0,0397 0,20 856
beti 0,1968 0,40 925 0,3333 0,47 69 0,1857 0,39 856
kako 0,0422 0,20 925 0,0435 0,21 69 0,0421 0,20 856
other/unknown ethnic group 0,0291 0,16 925 0,0434 0,20 69 0,0280 0,16 856
Father= eldest brother 0,5449 0,50 925 0,6377 0,48 69 0,5374 0,50 856
N. father’s living brothers 1,9049 1,57 925 2,1159 1,93 69 1,8879 1,54 856
N. father’s living sisters 2,0703 1,68 925 2,5797 1,85 69 2,0292 1,65 856
N. men 24-59 1,0908 0,35 925 1,1884 0,49 69 1,0829 0,34 856
Polygyny 0,1881 0,39 925 0,1014 0,30 69 0,1951 0,40 856
Mother’s has final say alone 0,1081 0,31 925 0,2029 0,41 69 0,1005 0,30 856
on large household purchase
aThe school-age foster-relatives considered do not include foster-grand-children.
bIn polygynous households, the mother’s age (and education) is the one of the first spouse.
cAll the pregnancies a mother had; for polygynous households, all pregnancies of resident spouses.
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Table 5: Probit estimation: Effect of Hosting School-age Foster-relatives on Biological
Children Probability to Attain the 5th Level of Primary Education 1
Dependant Variable: A Biological Child has attained his 5th Level of Education
Probit Estimation Marginal Effects
Variable Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
HH hosts a foster-rel. 6-14 -0.019 (0.24) -0.007 (0.10)
Gender (female) -0.061 (0.11) -0.024 (0.04)
Age 0.369*** (0.04) 0.147*** (0.02)
N. pregnancies per HH -0.043 (0.03) -0.017 (0.01)
N. HH members 0.013 (0.03) 0.005 (0.01)
Mother’s age 0.029* (0.02) 0.012* (0.01)
Father’s age 0.003 (0.01) 0.001 (0.00)
Mother’s educ. 0.408*** (0.08) 0.163*** (0.03)
Father’s educ. 0.155** (0.07) 0.062** (0.03)
Wealth 0.255*** (0.07) 0.102*** (0.03)
Mother’s power -0.312* (0.18) -0.123* (0.07)
Rural -0.175 (0.16) -0.070 (0.06)
Catholic 0.645*** (0.23) 0.252*** (0.09)
Protestant 0.733*** (0.24) 0.285*** (0.09)
Animist 0.253 (0.37) 0.100 (0.14)
No/other religion 0.611** (0.28) 0.233** (0.10)
arabe -1.015*** (0.39) -0.356*** (0.10)
bui mandara -0.713* (0.37) -0.269** (0.13)
adama -0.935*** (0.31) -0.342*** (0.09)
bantoide south west -0.780* (0.46) -0.283** (0.14)
grassfiled -0.743** (0.36) -0.276** (0.12)
cotier -0.684* (0.37) -0.254** (0.12)
beti -0.390* (0.23) -0.153* (0.09)
kako -0.728** (0.32) -0.269*** (0.10)
other/unknown -0.806** (0.40) -0.292** (0.12)
Polygyny 0.112 (0.20) 0.045 (0.08)





N. obs. (N. clusters) 924 (603)
a* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; the estimation is robust to household level clustering
bReference group for religion: Muslim
cReference group for ethnic group: bamilike bamoun
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Table 6: Biprobit Estimation of Equation (1): The Biological Children Education Equation
1
Dependant variable: A Biological Child has attained his 5th Level of Education
Biprobit Coeff. SE
HH hosts a foster-rel. 6-142 -1,0853 ** 0,56
Gender (female) -0,0591 0,10
Age 0,3580 *** 0,04
N. Pregnancies per HH -0,0454 * 0,03
N. HH member 0,0148 0,03
Mother’s age 0,0292 ** 0,02
Father’s age 0,0015 0,01
Mother’s educ. 0,4161 *** 0,08
Father’s educ. 0,1417 ** 0,07
Wealth 0,2572 *** 0,07
Mother’s power -0,2299 0,18
Rural -0,1746 0,15
Catholic3 0,7280 *** 0,23
Protestant 0,7812 *** 0,24
Animist 0,3722 0,35
No/other religion 0,5901 ** 0,28
arabe4 -0,9309 ** 0,38
bui mandara -0,6735 ** 0,35
adama -0,8366 *** 0,28
bantoide SO -0,7401 * 0,44
grassfield -0,6262 * 0,36
cotier -0,6434 * 0,36
beti -0,2722 0,23
kako -0,6876 ** 0,30
other/unknown -0,6488 0,40
Polygyny 0,1178 0,20
N. men 24-59 0,1539 0,16
Constant -7,2902 *** 0,86
Other controls5 YES
ρ 0,5536 0,23




a* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; the estimation is robust to household level clustering
bThe related marginal effect equals -0,3706 with a standard error of 0.14 and is significant at 5 percent level
cReference group for religion: Muslim
dReference group for ethnic group: bamilike bamoun
eOther controls include regional dummies (ref.:the littoral)
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Table 7: Biprobit Estimation of Equation (2): The School-Age Foster-Relative Supply
Equation 1
Dependant variable: the HH hosts a School-Age Foster-relative
Coeff. SE
Father is the eldest of 0,3985 ** 0,20
his brothers
Father’s N. of living sisters 0,0746 0,05
Father’s N. of living brothers 0,0497 0,06
N. pregnancies per HH -0,0507 0,05
N. HH members 0,0296 0,03
Mother’s age 0,0080 0,02
Father’s age -0,0135 0,02
Mother’s educ. 0,2315 ** 0,10
Father’s educ -0,0789 0,09
Wealth 0,1034 0,10
Mother’s power 0,3847 * 0,23
Rural 0,0641 0,22
Catholic2 1,2197 *** 0,36
Protestant 0,9672 *** 0,35
Animist 1,4011 *** 0,50
Other religion 0,5360 0,62
arabe3 0,7818 0,56
bui mandara 0,1087 0,49
adama 0,6129 0,40
bantoide SO -0,2569 0,54
grassfield 0,5556 0,34
cotier 0,0616 0,50
beti 0,7150 ** 0,30
kako 0,0663 0,47
other/unknown 0,9609 ** 0,47
Polygyny 0,0872 0,35
N. men 24-59 0,2102 0,19
Constant -3,9661 *** 0,84
Other controls4 YES
N 924
a* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; the estimation is robust to household level
clustering
bReference group for religion: Muslim
cReference group for ethnic group: bamilike bamoun
dOther controls include regional dummies (ref.: the littoral).37Document de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2009.49
Table 8: Robustness Checks: Descriptive Statistics of the Biological Children Sample
Whole Sample With School-age Without School-age
Foster-relative Foster-relative
Variable Mean S. D. Obs Mean S. D. Obs Mean S. D. Obs
N. mother’s living brothers 2,1254 1,54 925 2,4638 1,51 69 2,0981 1,54 856
N. mother’s living sisters 2,2000 1,75 925 2,0725 1,80 69 2,2103 1,74 856
Electricity access 0,5103 0,78 925 0,7971 1,18 69 0,4871 0,74 856
Floor =cement 0,3838 0,49 925 0,5072 0,50 69 0,3738 0,48 856
Source water= home 0,0886 0,28 925 0,2029 0,41 69 0,0794 0,27 856
HH has a motorcycle 0.16030 0.36 917 0.14925 0.35 67 0.16117 0.36 850
HH has a bicycle 0.24754 .43 917 0.17910 0.38 67 0.25294 0.43 850
N. living daughters2 3.2443 2.12 925 2.4637 1.57 69 3.3072 2.15 856
N. hosted orphans 6-141 0.03135 0.18 925 0.04347 0.20 69 0.03037 0.17 856
aCalculated at the level of a household.
bEither single or double, grand-children, head’s brother or sister, or other relative or non relative.
Table 9: Characteristics of households headed by a male who is either the eldest of his
brothers or who is not and where biological children of 10-14 years old are present
Father is the eldest brother Father is not the eldest
brother
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. N (1) - (2)
(1) (2) 1
N. father’s living brothers 1.362 1.44 329 2.495 1.357 275 -***
N. father’s living sisters 2.064 1.705 329 2.051 1.591 275 +
N. mother’s living brothers 2.088 1.494 329 2.196 1.616 275 -
N. mother’s living sisters 2.134 1.64 329 2.335 1.818 275 -
N. living daughters2 3.060 0.11 329 2.778 0,10 275 +*
N. orphans 6-14 3 0,036 0,01 329 0,029 0,01 275 +
Access to electricity 0,501 0,05 329 0,502 0,03 275 -
Source water=home 0,088 0,01 329 0,098 0,02 275 -
Floor=cement 0.343 0,02 329 0,418 0,03 275 -*
Has a bicycle 0,362 0,05 329 0,207 0,02 275 +***
Has a motorcycle 0,246 0,05 329 0,131 0,02 275 +**
a* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The test of significance of mean difference is done given unequal variance.
bCalculated at the level of a household.
cEither single or double, grand-children, head’s brother or sister, or other relative or non relative.
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